Showing posts with label Supreme Court of India. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Supreme Court of India. Show all posts

Thursday, October 6, 2022

Supreme Court grants 'breathing time' to remove encroachment by hospital from water body [26.09.2022]

ITEM NO.27 
COURT NO.9 
SECTION XII 
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS 

Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s). 16298/2022 
(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 06-09-2022 in WP No. 23977/2022 
passed by the High Court Of Judicature At Madras) 

KOPPERUNDEVI                                                                                 Petitioner(s) 
VERSUS 

THE DISTRICT COLLECTOR & ORS.                                           Respondent(s) 

(FOR ADMISSION and I.R. and IA No.136614/2022-EXEMPTION FROM FILING C/C OF THE IMPUGNED JUDGMENT ) 

Date : 26-09-2022 

This petition was called on for hearing today. 

CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DINESH MAHESHWARI 
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE BELA M. TRIVEDI 

For Petitioner(s) Dr. Nanda Kishore, AOR 
For Respondent(s) 

UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following 

O R D E R

The High Court of Judicature at Madras had expected in its order dated 30.11.2017 in W.P. No. 31168 of 2017, that the respondents shall take appropriate action for removal of encroachments in the watercourse, which included the land comprising Survey No. 134 at Virudhachalam Town. There had also been a contempt petition filed in the High Court bearing No. 1635 of 2022, alleging non-compliance of the order so passed by the High Court.

The authorities concerned having, thus, been jolted into  action, the building in question, said to be housing a multi-speciality hospital, also came to be marked for removal, for being an encroachment over the land of watercourse/water body. As against this action, the petitioner attempted to invoke writ jurisdiction of the High Court while suggesting entitlement over the building in question, with reference to a property tax receipt of the year 2021-22. However, the petitioner essentially made the submissions before the High Court that she was ready to move to the alternative arrangement but required some breathing time for the same.

In the impugned order dated 06.09.2022, the High Court referred to the requirements of removal of encroachments with reference to the various decisions of this Court including that in Jagpal Singh v. State of Punjab: (2011) 11 SCC 396; and found no reason to grant any indulgence. Hence, the petitioner seeks special leave to appeal.

While seeking some relaxation/leniency, the petitioner has essentially stated as under: -

“The petitioner herein beg before this Hon’ble Court some time to vacate the Hospital run by the Petitioner in the name and style of “Deivam hospital” at Ulundurpet Road, Vridhachalam. The said hospital in running with 15 beds, upto 15 visiting doctors, 10 para medics such Nurses, lab technicians, ANMS and 15 non technical staff such as helpers, cashier, accountant, receptionist etc. Further, it is respectfully submitted that at present 15 in-patients taking treatment in the hospital and regularly 50 to 100 patients visit the hospital as out-patients. Further, the hospital has operation theater, ICU and lab facilities available and also wards such as common words, Special rooms and delivery wards etc. are available with the hospital.”  Learned senior counsel for the petitioner has also made a fervent plea for granting some time to vacate, particularly in view of the services being rendered in the hospital in question.

While rendering the health care services could be a laudable objective, establishment of a hospital for that purpose in the land of watercourse or water body cannot be countenanced. The reference to in-patients and other visiting patients is also seriously questionable, where a sympathy is sought to be gained with reference to their requirements.

We have no doubt that if the genuine case of a needy patient is before the revenue authorities, which include the District Collector, Cuddalore, they would take appropriate steps for ensuring alternative health care facilities to the patient concerned.

Though no relaxation as such appears available to the petitioner but, only for the purpose of extending some breathing time to the petitioner for removal of the moveables and making alternative arrangements, we are inclined to grant some time to the petitioner even without issuing notice to the respondents but, only until 10.10.2022.

Such a relaxation would be available to the petitioner only if she submits a specific undertaking to this Court supported by her affidavit within three days from today, that the building in question shall be vacated on or before 10.10.2022 and no hindrance would be caused in its removal  after 10.10.2022; and further that she would not claim any compensation in regard to the removal of the encroachment as also shifting of movables. While removing the encroachment in question, the authorities shall, obviously, be expected to take appropriate care of the bona fide need of patients and provide them alternative medical support, if so required.

Having regard to the circumstances of the case, we are not disposing of this petition but would keep the same pending, while awaiting compliance from the petitioner as also from the respondents.

To avoid any ambiguity, we make it clear that another attempt to obstruct removal of encroachment was not countenanced by this Court, when we dismissed SLP(Civil) No. 15945 of 2022 on 19.09.2022, which was filed by Indra Nagar Residents Welfare Association while leaving it open for that petitioner to make appropriate request before the High Court as regards the prayer for alternative reliefs to its members, including that of rehabilitation. So far the present matter is concerned, a little breathing time is being provided to the petitioner subject to the undertaking as aforesaid only because of the reference to the likely difficulties of the patients, particularly indoor patients, who may require alternative arrangements. However, this order, in no way, absolve the authorities concerned from carrying out earnestly the task of removal of encroachments, as expected under the orders of the High Court.

List this matter on 17.10.2022.

A copy of this order be forwarded to the District Collector, Cuddalore, for appropriate compliance and then, for submission of compliance report.

Tuesday, August 30, 2022

Supreme Court of India: If no pond exists on site, revenue records can be corrected after inspection [26.08.2022]

REPORTABLE 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5841/ 2022 
ARISING OUT OF 
PETITION FOR SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL (CIVIL) NO. 37439 OF 2016 


THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND ANOTHER                                                 .… APPELLANTS 

Versus 

ULTRATECH CEMENT LTD                                                                                .... RESPONDENT 

JUDGMENT

HIMA KOHLI, J.

26.08.2022

1. Leave granted.

2. The appellant–State of Rajasthan has assailed the judgment dated 26th February, 2016, passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan Bench at Jaipur whereby the order dated 05th October, 2012, passed by the learned Single Judge dismissing a writ petition preferred by the respondent–Ultratech Cement Ltd. (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 15416 of 2012) was set aside and its appeal allowed with a direction to the appellant–State Government to process the allotment of the land in favour of the respondent–Company for setting up a cement plant in Tehsil Nawalgarh, District Jhunjhunu, in terms of the letter of allotment dated 23 rd February, 2012.

3. A brief overview of the facts of the case is necessary.

3.1 With the idea of setting up a Cement plant having the capacity of 3 million tons of cement per annum in four villages situated in Tehsil Nawalgarh, District Jhunjhunu, spreading over 1000 hectares of land, the respondent–Company purchased/acquired 400 hectares of land through direct negotiations and took steps to acquire the remaining part of land through private negotiations, as also by way of allotment through RIICO. For executing the project of cement manufacturing, the respondent–Company applied to the appellant–State Government in the year 2000 – 2001 for grant of adjoining mining leases for mineral lime stone (cement grade) in Tehsil Nawalgarh, District Jhunjhunu. A letter of intent was issued by the appellant–State Government on 16th March, 2002 in respect of two mining leases, but due to non-availability of environment clearance within the stipulated time, the said LOI was cancelled by the State Government by order dated 07th February, 2005. The said order was challenged by the respondent–Company by preferring a revision petition before the Mines Tribunal which was allowed vide order dated 19th July, 2007 and the matter was remitted back to the State Government for fresh examination in accordance with law. The appellant–State Government vide order dated 22nd November, 2007, restored the LOI subject to compliance of certain conditions and on an undertaking to be furnished by the respondent–Company. The said LOI was however, cancelled by the Mines Tribunal vide order dated 29 th July, 2009. Aggrieved by the said cancellation order, the respondent–Company approached the High Court by filing a writ petition which was allowed vide order dated 19th August, 2010 and the appellant–State Government finally issued a LOI on 28th October, 2010. 

3.2 This time, the District Collector, Jhunjhunu issued an approval letter dated 23 rd February, 2012, for allocation of Government land falling under mining lease area to the respondent–Company for setting up a cement plant subject to the fulfillment of certain conditions stipulated therein. The captioned letter issued by the District Collector, Jhunjhunu is extracted hereinbelow:

“Sir, Vide above referred letter under above mentioned subject, the State Government has granted approval for reservation and allocation of land falling under mining lease area for setting up a cement plant is granted under Section 92 of the L.R. Act which shall be subject to the fulfillment of the below mentioned conditions: -

(i) Approval for allocation of the land recorded as pasture land in the mining leased area is given in favour of the applicant company subject to the condition that the company shall surrender the land equivalent to the allocated land after purchasing it in the same village and after developing it as grazing land and will also make it available to the concerned Gram Panchayat after doing fencing of the four walls of the land.

(ii) In-principle consent for allocation of the gair-mumkin johad land falling under mining lease area, as applied for by the company, is given in favour of the company subject to the condition that company shall purchase other land and develop it as Johad and surrender it to the Gram Panchayat. The company shall also produce NOC/ orders for allocation of Johad land obtained from Hon'ble High Court.

(iii)Company's application for allocation will be considered only after producing permission/ NOC of the competent authority of Panchayat Raj Vibhag and Education Department for gair-mumkin abadi school, graveyard, maszid etc. situated on the mining lease area.

(iv) 0.32 Hectare land in the mining lease area is recorded in the name of Ajmer Electricity Distribution Corporation Ltd. Above land shall be allocated in favour of the applicant-company on producing NOC from the Ajmer Electricity Distribution Corporation Ltd.

(v) Consent is issued for allocation of the classified land of gair-mumkin Bani & gair-mumkin passage as per your proposal which falls under mining lease area for the purpose in accordance with rules.

Therefore, kindly ensure action as above.

Encl: as above.

Sd/-

District Collector, Jhunjhunu” 

3.3 In view of condition No. (iii) contained in the captioned letter which called upon the respondent–Company to produce NOC/orders for allocation of ‘Johad’ land from the High Court, the respondent–Company approached the High Court by filing S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.15416/2012. Accompanying the said writ petition were several documents pertaining to the spot inspection of the site, the Reports of the Tehsildar and the correspondence between the parties to demonstrate that the subject land that had been classified as ‘Johad’, neither fell in the catchment area, nor did water gather there and there did not exist any natural source of water on the subject land and therefore, classification of the subject land could be converted to ‘Siwai Chak’ land. Not persuaded by the averments made in the writ petition, the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition at the stage of admission itself with an observation that it is for the State Government to decide whether the disputed land is ‘Johad’ land or not and that the Court was bound by the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court in the case of Abdul Rahman v. State of Rajasthan and Others.

3.4 Dissatisfied with the in limine dismissal of its writ petition, the respondent–Company preferred an appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court registered as D.B.Special Appeal (Writ) No. 73/2013. Noting that several representations submitted by the respondent–Company to the appellant–State Government for examining the matter afresh and for making necessary corrections in the revenue records were pending, vide order dated 23rd November, 2015, the Division Bench directed the appellant–State Government to consider the respondent’s representations in the light of the observations made in the case of Director General, Research and Development v. State of Rajasthan & Others, in particular, para 3 thereof, that is extracted hereinbelow:

“It is conceded on facts that in fact there is no Gair Mumkin Nadi existing on the spot, therefore the decision rendered by the Division Bench of this court in (Abdul Rahman Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors.) shall not come in the way of the respondents in making the allotment. In view of aforesaid factual matrix and considering the nature of requirement, we direct that let the allotment be processed as assured within six weeks from today". 

While passing the aforesaid order, it was made clear that in the event the appellant– State Government does not decide the representation of the respondent–Company, the appeal will be decided on merits.

3.5 In compliance of the aforesaid order, the appellant–State Government passed an order dated 25th January, 2016, holding inter alia that the subject land having been recorded in the revenue record as ‘Johad’, no allotment could be made in favour of the respondent–Company. In view of the aforesaid stand taken by the appellant–State Government, the Division Bench proceeded to hear the respondent’s appeal on merits and allowed the same by virtue of the impugned judgment whereunder the appellant– State Government has been directed to allot the subject land in question to the respondent–Company and take consequential steps in the matter. 

3.6 The High Court has specifically recorded in the impugned judgment that learned counsel for the appellant–State Government did not dispute the fact even before the Court that though the subject land in question was classified as ‘Johad’, it neither fell within any catchment area, nor did water ever collect there and there was no natural water reservoir on the subject land. The court opined that looking at the topography of the area, the site in question did not have use for any other purpose at all. In fact, the said site selected for mining, had commercially viable lime stone deposits and the selection was made after due consultation with the Gram Panchayat, Baswa. Thus, there was no justification for turning down the fact-finding Reports filed by the Tehsildar, Land Records, Nawalgarh, regarding the status of the land. In fact, the said Reports had been duly accepted by the appellant–State Government.

3.7 The impugned judgment went on to record that in Abdul Rahman’s case, referred to by the learned Single Judge, the Court had only directed the State Government to chalk out a plan for restoration of the catchment areas to their original shape. The said judgment did not prohibit alienation of the property held as a public trust except for highlighting the fact that any such alienation would require a higher degree of judicial scrutiny, thus creating a balance between the Doctrine of Public Trust and the Doctrine of Sustainable Development. It was observed that a pragmatic view ought to be taken in the matter, more so, when the area classified as ‘Johad’, did not fall in any catchment area, nor was there any natural water reservoir for it to be declassified from the category of ‘Johad’ to ‘Sawai Chak’ land.

4 Mr. Milind Kumar, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the appellant–State Government has assailed the impugned judgment by submitting that the same runs contrary to the judgment of the High Court in Abdul Rehman’s case where it has been held by the Division Bench that no right can be given to use Nadi land or other water bodies for construction activity and that catchment of pond/water reservoir shall not be allotted for any personal/commercial purposes; that utilizing the ‘Johad’ land for commercial purpose may cause environmental damage; that the High Court has erred in placing reliance on Director General, Research and Development; that there are decisions of this Court as in Vellore Citizens’ Welfare Forum v. Union of India and Others, A.P Pollution Control Board v. Prof. M. V. Nayudu (Retd.) And Others, Lafarge Umiam Mining Private Limited (Applicant) in T.N. Godarvarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India and Others, Electrotherm (India) Limited v. Patel Vipulkumar Ramjibhai and others, Common Cause v. Union of India, Alembic Pharmaceuticals Limited v. Rohit Prajapati and Others that have highlighted the use of precautionary principle in environmental matters and held that the burden of proof is on the project proponent who is proposing to alter the status quo or impact the environment. Reference was also sought to be placed on the judgment of this Court in Jagpal Singh and Others v. State of Punjab and Others, where directions were issued to all State Governments to prepare schemes for eviction of illegal occupants of Gram Sabha land and for restoration of the said land for common use of the villagers of the area. Learned counsel for the appellant–State Government went on to refer some additional documents filed recently, in particular, letter dated 07th July, 2014, addressed by the Tehsildar, Nawalgarh to the District Collector which mentioned the status of land in one of the four villages identified as mining area in district Jhunjhunu, namely Village Baswa and stated that in some khasra numbers of the said village, there exists a pucca pond which acts as a catchment area of rain water. Some circulars issued by the State Government have also been cited which state that all the allotments which were recorded in the revenue records as nala, river, pond, dam or embankment after 1955 and were converted by changing the land classification from agricultural purpose to non-agricultural purpose, be referred to the competent Court with the relevant facts for classification of allotment.

5 The aforesaid submissions have been repelled by Mr. Hiren P. Raval, Senior Advocate appearing for the respondent–Company who submitted that the present appeal is not maintainable when the appellant–State Government has already given its in-principle consent for the respondent–Company to use the subject land for mining purpose subject to obtaining a No Objection Certificate from the High Court. Once the High Court has given a No Objection Certificate in terms of the view expressed in the impugned judgment, there was no occasion to file the present appeal. On merits, it was submitted that there is no good reason for the appellant–State Government to have refused to rectify the error in the revenue records in respect of the classification of the parcel of land, part of which has been wrongly classified as ‘Gair-Mumkin Johad’ i.e. reservoir land, despite the fact that the Tehsildar, Nawalgarh and the District Collector, Jhunjhunu submitted two Reports stating inter alia that there was no water reservoir on the subject land at any point in time. To substantiate the said submissions, learned counsel referred to the two Reports submitted by the Tehsildar, Nawalgarh dated 19th/27th April, 2011 and 25th November, 2012/5th December, 2012. He also took this Court through the recommendations made by the District Collector, Jhunjhunu calling upon the State Government to examine the matter and pass appropriate orders. In particular, he referred to the letters dated 19th December, 2012 and 26th, February, 2013, addressed by the District Collector, Jhunjhunu to the Deputy Secretary, Revenue Department of the State Government recommending change of class of the land in the revenue records from ‘Gair-Mumkin Johad’ to ‘Sawai Chak’ land, on the basis of the certificates issued by the Tehsildar, Nawalgarh. Learned counsel pointed out that at no stage has the appellant–State Government disputed the Reports of the Tehsildar or the recommendations made by the District Collector. Instead, it has been harping on the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of Rajasthan in Abdul Rehman’s case, without appreciating that the said judgment has not declared that alienation of property held as a public trust, is totally prohibited. It was submitted that the fact situations of each case would have to be examined before taking a decision and in the instant case, it is not disputed by the appellant–State Government that the subject land does not fall in any catchment area, water does not collect there and there is no natural water reservoir on the land. In all this back and forth that commenced in the year 2000 and is continuing till now, the environment clearances issued in favour of the respondent–Company are going to lapse at the end of the year 2022, which would automatically result in cancellation of the LOI issued by the appellant–State Government, thus, leaving the respondent–Company high and dry for no fault attributable to it. It was therefore urged that the impugned judgment does not deserve to be interfered with, as it is based on fact finding Reports submitted by the revenue authorities that have not been questioned by the appellant–State Government till date. We have heard the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, perused the impugned judgment and the documents placed on record. The only issue that arises for the consideration of this Court is that once an in-principle consent has already been accorded by the appellant–State Government for reservation and allocation of the subject land under the mining lease in favour of the respondent– Company for it to set up a cement plant and the condition inserted in the approval letter dated 23rd February, 2012 that the respondent–Company should produce a No Objection Certificate / order from the High Court permitting allocation of ‘Gair–Mumkin Johad’ land stands satisfied by virtue of the impugned judgment, would a challenge still lie against the same at the instance of the appellant–State Government? A perusal of the impugned judgment indicates the following factors that have weighed with the High Court for allowing the appeal preferred by the respondent– Company :-

(a) That the Tehsildar, Nawalgarh had made a physical spot inspection of the subject land in question and submitted a detailed Report to the District Collector, Jhunjhunu on 19th April, 2011 stating that the subject land, classified as a ‘Johad’ neither fell in the catchment area, nor did water ever collect there and that no natural source of water existed on the subject land;That the subject land was again inspected by the Tehsildar, Land Records, Nawalgarh, who sent a Report to the District Collector, Jhunjhunu on 25th November, 2012 / 05th December, 2012 stating inter alia that there is no natural water body on the subject land and the ‘Gair-Mumkin Johad’ falling under the proposed mining lease area, does not fall within the water logging area or the catchment area. Therefore, a recommendation was made for change of the class of land and for recording it as ‘Sawai Chak’ land;

(b) That the District Collector, Jhunjhunu made his recommendations on two different occasions to the State Government for issuing necessary orders to correct the revenue records and change the classification of the land to be recorded as ‘Sawai Chak’ land.

(c) That on receiving a communication dated 01st February, 2013 from the State Government calling upon him to re-examine the matter and pass appropriate orders, the District Collector, Jhunjhunu had once again made a recommendation vide letter dated 26th February, 2013, that necessary orders for correction of the revenue records ought to be made in the instant case;

(d) That the Gram Panchayat Baswa, Tehsil Nawalgarh, District Jhunjhunu passed Resolution No.21 dated 03rd February, 2011, stating that no water had ever accumulated in the subject land and the Gram Panchayat had no objection in granting the said land classified as ‘Johad’, to the respondent– Company for mining lease purposes, subject to the Company giving equal measure of developed land to the Gram Panchayat in the same village;

(e) the Court took note of the undertaking given by the respondent–Company in the writ proceedings for initiating the following activities for the benefit of the surrounding villages –

(i) Equal and alternate land to be developed as 'Johad' in place of 'Johad' land in the mining activity area in the same village so that villagers could benefit from the basic amenities.
(ii) Creation of a water reservoir in the mined out area. 
(iii) Development of water harvesting structures for augmenting ground water recharging in the area.
(iv) Initiation of CSR activities in the surrounding villages.

(f) The respondent–Company gave an undertaking before the Court that development of the site for alternate ‘Johad’ would be done in a planned manner where the catchment area, water harvesting structures and cattle grazing land would be developed. The Company also undertook to convert Dug-cum-Bore Well (DCB Well) into injection wells in order to develop suitable drainage pattern for augmentation of ground water table; 

8 It is a matter of record that the appellant–State Government has not questioned the Reports prepared by the Tehsildar, Nawalgarh after making spot inspection on two occasions. The position remains the same even as of now. The first Report was prepared by the Tehsildar on 19th/27th April, 2011 and the second one on 25th November, 2012/05th December, 2012. Both the Reports were categorical in their findings that there was no natural water body on the subject land classified as a ‘Johad’ and that the subject land neither fell in the catchment area, nor did water ever collect there and there was no natural source of water that existed on the subject land. That being the position, we see no reason to permit learned counsel for the appellant–State Government to rely on a communication dated 02nd July, 2014, addressed by the Tehsildar to the District Collector, in respect of a part of the subject land falling in village Baswa to urge that there exists a pucca pond at some spots, more so when there is no explanation for not filing the documents. The aforesaid communication could have easily been filed by the appellant–State Government before the High Court at the appropriate stage, well before the date of passing of the impugned judgment. Nothing prevented the appellant–State Government from producing the relevant photographs of the purported pucca pond existing at some spots within village Baswa. It is not the case of the appellant–State Government that the earlier Reports submitted by the Tehsildar, Nawalgarh after conducting a physical spot inspection had been manipulated or prepared in a mala fide manner, nor is there any averment made in the appeal that departmental action was initiated against the then Tehsildar, Nawalgarh for having prepared incorrect Reports of the spot inspection. Given the said position, there is no reason to discard the two Inspection Reports prepared by the Tehsildar, Nawalgarh that form a part of the record. Both the said Reports have stated in clear terms that there is no natural water body on the subject land and the ‘Gair–Mumkin Johad’ falling under the proposed mining lease area does not fall within the water logging area or the catchment area. We, therefore, decline to give any weightage to the letter dated 07th July, 2014 addressed by the Tehsildar, Nawalgarh to the District Collector, Jhunjhunu. 

9 The Circulars dated 26th June, 2012, 17th April, 2013 and 26th July, 2017 issued by the Revenue Department can also not be of any assistance to the appellant–State Government, for the simple reason that the said circulars came to be issued in compliance of the judgments of the High Court and this Court directing removal of encroachment from the Gram Panchayat land and eviction of unauthorized occupants therefrom. The present case does not fall in the above categories for the simple reason that the respondent–Company has applied through proper channel for allotment of land for mining purpose; it has received requisite environment clearances followed by LOIs issued by the appellant–State Government. Armed with the necessary approvals from the State Government for reservation and allocation of land falling under mining lease area, the respondent–Company had approached the revenue authorities for setting up a plant on the subject land and requested that necessary changes be made in the revenue records pertaining to land described as ‘Johad’ at certain spots, where in fact, no ‘Johad’ actually existed. In this context, the recommendations made by the District Collector, Jhunjhunu gain significance. The first letter in this regard was addressed by the District Collector to the Deputy Secretary, Revenue Department of the appellant–State Government on 19th December, 2012, relevant extract whereof is reproduced hereinbelow:

“When a site inspection report in this connection was sought from Tehsildar, Nawalgarh, he informed vide his letter No.2501 dated 5.12.12 that there is a government primary school building on the gair-mumkin Johad land of Khasra No.493 area 3.96 hectare, Khasra No.546 raqba 16. 73 hectare, Khasra No.608 raqba 17.55 hectare, Khasra No.649 raqba 4.81 hectare, Khasra No.1304/493 raqba 0.14 hectare and Khasra No.1316/ 608 raqba 0.11 hectare land situated in village Basawa and rest of the land does not come within the catchment area. Land of the above mentioned Khasra Numbers does not have any natural water reservoir, nor it is in the catchment area. Tehsildar, Nawalgarh has recommended to change its class and declare it Sivaychak land.

In perspective of the above decisions of Hon'ble Rajasthan High Court and enclosing herewith the Tehsildar Report attached with letter No.2501 dated 5.12.12 (copy enclosed) and copy of the enclosed Jamabandi for Samvat 2067-2070, it is submitted that Tehsildar's report has been analyzed and I am satisfied with the report. As per the site inspection report of the Gair-mumkin Johad land of Khasra No.493 area 3.96 hectare, Khasra No.546 raqba 16.73 hectare, Khasra No.608 raqba 17.55 hectare, Khasra No.649 raqba 4.81 hectare, Khasra No.1304/4 93 raqba 0.14 hectare and Khasra No.1316/608 raqba 0.11 hectare land situated in village Basawa, there is a government primary school on 0.10 hectare land out of 16.73 hectare of Khasra No.546 it is recommended that class of the above land may be changed and allocated to M/s Ultratech Cement Limited Co. in accordance with law.” 

10 After receiving the aforesaid letter, the Secretary, Revenue Department addressed a letter dated 1st February, 2013 to the District Collector, Jhunjhunu clearly stating inter alia that only he as the ‘District Collector’ must certify whether the land in question is a ‘Johad’ land or not and the said certification is not to be done by the State Government. Therefore, the District Collector was directed to visit the site himself and inquire into the matter and then issue appropriate orders. In compliance of the said directions, the District Collector wrote another letter dated 26th February, 2013 to the Deputy Secretary, Revenue Department, reiterating that the revenue records do not record any water reservoir in the relevant khasra numbers of the subject land and it was in this background that letter dated 19th December, 2012 had been issued by him recommending change of class of the land on the basis of the certification of the Tehsildar, Nawalgarh in the revenue records. It was again stated by the District Collector that in the light of the Report of the Tehsildar and the copies of old and current revenue records, orders may be issued by the State Government with regard to change of class of the proposed land that was entered into revenue records as ‘Johad’. 

11 The aforesaid material has been examined at length in the impugned judgment. The High Court has also taken note of the Resolution passed by the Gram Panchayat, village Baswa and the certificate issued by the Gram Panchayat which records that no water had ever accumulated on the subject land and the Gram Panchayat did not have any objection to the said land being granted to the respondent–Company for mining lease purpose subject to the condition that it would be receiving an equal measure of developed land in the same village from the respondent–Company in view of the land being consumed for mining lease purpose. The respondent–Company has also given undertakings to the High Court that the environment of the village will not be adversely impacted and the ecological balance shall be maintained. One of the undertakings given by the respondent–Company is that the site identified for development of an alternate ‘Johad’ would be identified and developed in a planned manner, so as to create a catchment area, water harvesting structure and cattle grazing land. 

12 Given the above background, reliance placed by learned counsel for the appellant–State Government on the judgments cited by him, is found to be misplaced. In Vellore Citizens’ Welfare Forum6 and A.P Pollution Control Board, this Court recognized the requirement of reconciliation between the concept of development and ecology as a facet of sustainable development. The relevant Articles of the Constitution of India including Articles 21, 47, 48-A, 51-A (g) that protect and improve the environment have been highlighted and the Precautionary Principle and Polluter-Pays Principle have been declared to be a part of the environmental law of the country. It has also been accepted that the burden of proof should lie on the entity proposing an activity that is potentially harmful to the environment. There can be no quarrel with the above position, but neither of the aforesaid judgments are relevant in the facts and circumstances of the instant case, inasmuch as no burden has been placed on the respondent–Company to demonstrate that the industry proposed to be set up by it, shall not cause any serious and/or irreversible harm to the ecology of the area. On the contrary, it is the stand of the Revenue Department of the appellant–State Government itself that there is no likelihood of any damage to the ecology of the area as the spot inspections reveal that there is no pond existing on the subject land that may be impacted adversely.

13 In Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India, this Court had the occasion to discuss the Precautionary Principle and it was held that the said principle and the corresponding burden of proof on the person who wants to change the status quo, will ordinarily apply in the case of polluting or other projects or industry where the extent of damage likely to be inflicted, is not known. But when the effect of the project is known, then the principles of sustainable development would come into play which will ensure that mitigative steps can be taken to preserve the ecological balance. In the present case, there is no such uncertainty due to lack of availability of data or scientific material about the damage if any, likely to be caused to the ecological balance of the area. Instead, detailed spot inspections have been conducted by the revenue authorities from time to time that establish that there is no ‘Johad’ existing on the subject land. Despite that, the respondent–Company has been directed to develop an alternate ‘Johad’ in a planned manner at the same area, as a mitigative step which it has undertaken to execute.

14 In Lafarge Umiam Mining Private Limited, this Court has recognized the fact that the environment has different facets and universal dependence of humans for the use of environmental resources for the most basic needs, inescapably requires choices to be made at different levels on environmental protection and factor in the risks which are to be regulated, as recognized by the concept of sustainable development. Conceding that it is impossible to lay down ‘across-the-board’ principles and much would depend on the facts of each case, this Court opined that what was required to be seen was how much protection would be sufficient and whether ends would be served by diverting resources to other uses and at the same time, strike a fine balance between environmental protection and environmental risk. No such fine balance is required to be struck in the instant case when admittedly, the spot inspections show that there does not exist any ‘Johad’ on the subject land that is likely to be affected on account of the change proposed in the revenue records.

15 The directions issued in Jagpal Singh’s case calling upon State Governments to prepare a scheme for eviction of illegal/unauthorized occupants of Gram Sabha land also do not come in the way of the respondent–Company. The purpose of the said direction was to prepare a scheme for removal of illegal occupants expeditiously. This does not prevent the respondent–Company from approaching the Court for correction in the revenue records when the site inspection Reports prepared by the Revenue Authorities show that there is no water body or catchment area on the subject land. 

16 The focus in the case of Electrotherm (India) Limited was on conducting public hearings as a mandatory requirement of the environmental clearance process and the Court has frowned upon doing away with public hearings in the course of the decision- making process. In the case of Common Cause, this Court was seized of the aspect of illegal/unlawful mining in the State of Odisha and it was observed that Courts cannot interfere with the Mining Policy or lay down limits on the extent of mining activity that should be permitted by the State/Central Government. The said decision does not have any application to the facts of the instant case where the appellant–State Government has already given an in-principle consent for setting up a cement plant in favour of the respondent–Company and the High Court was only required to examine the aspect of correction in the revenue records in relation to the subject land where a ‘Johad’ was mentioned, but none existed at site.

17 In Alembic Pharmaceuticals’ case, the issue before this Court was with respect to the operation of industries without obtaining prior environmental clearance for a long time and their liability on account of such non-compliance. Noting that the industries had evaded the legally binding regime of obtaining environment clearance, it was held that penalty must be imposed on them for disobedience and non-compliance of the rules and regulations. Here, the respondent–Company has admittedly received environmental clearances and in spite of the same, its project has not taken off due to various hurdles created by the appellant–State Government. Clearly, the present case is not one of breach of any norms for imposition of penalty on the respondent–Company. 

18 Even the judgment of the Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Abdul Rehman is being completely misread by the appellant–State Government. The focus in the said judgment was on the restoration of the catchment area to its original shape for which a plan was directed to be drawn up which included demarcation of the catchment areas, demarcation of drainage channels etc. Nowhere in the said judgment has it been observed that the description of a land as a pond in the revenue records, when no pond exists on site, cannot be corrected after conducting a spot inspection. We are inclined to accept the submission made by learned counsel for the respondent–Company that in the absence of any pond at the spot, the decision rendered in the case of Abdul Rehman cannot be an impediment for processing the application of the respondent–Company for allocation of the subject land, for setting up a cement plant. The High Court has rightly referred to the decision of this Court in Director General, Research and Development, where noting the fact that there was no ‘Gair-Mumkin’ Nadi existing on the spot, it was observed that the decision of the High Court in Abdul Rahman will not come in the way of allotting the land to the petitioner.  

19 For the aforesaid reasons, we concur with the findings returned in the impugned judgment which is upheld. The appellant–State Government is directed to take necessary steps to process the allotment of the subject land in favour of the respondent–Company within four weeks from today. The respondent–Company shall file a fresh undertaking with the State Government, within the same timeline, as was filed by it before the High Court, for initiating time bound activities for the benefit of the surrounding villages, as compensatory measures for the allocation of the subject land. The appeal is dismissed while leaving the parties to bear their own expenses.

.................................CJI.
[N. V. RAMANA] 

...................................J.
[HIMA KOHLI] 

.................................J. 
[C. T. RAVIKUMAR]

Wednesday, April 27, 2022

SC ruling on village common land: Haryana sets timelines for restoration of illegally-sold panchayat land [22.04.2022]

Following the recent Supreme Court orders that village common land (‘shamilat deh’) can neither be repartitioned among the proprietors nor sold, the Haryana government has started the process of restoring illegally-sold land chunks back to the gram panchayats. All pending cases under Section 13(a) regarding adjudication of title of ‘shamilat deh’ will be decided by the district collector within six months (by October 31).

_________________________________________


Following the recent Supreme Court orders that village common land (‘shamilat deh’) can neither be repartitioned among the proprietors nor sold, the Haryana government has started the process of restoring illegally-sold land chunks back to the gram panchayats.

A deadline for it is being fixed by the revenue department. Thousands of acres of village common land in Haryana which was sold off by shareholders or gram panchayats for monetary gains will thus get freed.

As per the decision taken by the state government, mutations will be entered by the halqa patwari of land recorded as ‘shamilat deh’ in the revenue records – the latest ‘jamabandi’ or the first ‘jamabandi’ after revenue settlement or consolidation as per Section 29(G)(1) of the Punjab Village Common Lands Act, 1961, immediately in favour of the panchayat deh within a week by April 30.

The mutation will be compared by the field kanungo by May 7 and sanctioned within a fortnight by May 25 by the assistant collector (second grade).

If the ‘shamilat deh’was partitioned or alienated illegally previously, the mutation thereof will also be entered by the halqa patwari in favour of panchayat by May 10, compared by kanungo by May 17 and after hearing the third-party interest created illegally, the mutation may be treated as contested by the circle revenue officer by May 25. It will be decided by the assistant collector (first grade) within next two months (by July 31).

Chief secretary Sanjeev Kaushal said keeping in view the gravity of the matter, the state government will implement the apex court’s directions on priority basis.

Officials said any person can subsequently take recourse to Section 13(a) of the Punjab Village Common Lands Act, 1961 before the collector for raising a dispute and claiming right, title or interest in the land vested in panchayat by filing a suit for adjudication.

All pending cases under Section 13(a) regarding adjudication of title of ‘shamilat deh’ will be decided by the district collector within six months (by October 31).

The ‘shamilat deh’ lands falling within municipal limits will continue to be shamilat deh and no partition or alienation can take place regarding the same, officials said.

Any proprietor of land entered as ‘jumla malkan’ or ‘mushtarka malkan’ lands on ground of taking of the permissible area under the ceiling laws can take the shelter of Section 13(a) of the 1961 Act before the collector in case of panchayat and before the competent civil court subsequently in case of municipal bodies and the necessary correction can be made in the revenue records by another mutation.

Additional chief secretary, revenue, PK Das said instructions for implementing the SC decision are being issued soon.

An apex court bench, headed by justice Hemant Gupta, had on April 7 held that the entire land reserved for common purposes by applying pro-rata cut had to be utilised by the gram panchayat for the present and future needs of the village community.

“No part of the land can be repartitioned among the proprietors and such land would not be available for sale,” the apex court had ruled.

The SC said the argument of the proprietors that the land which is not capable of being used for common purposes of the inhabitants of a village shall be reverted to the proprietors is untenable and unsustainable.

“The land has been put to common pool by applying pro-rata cut. Once pro-rata cut has been applied, the management and control of such land vest with the panchayat. There is no question of reverting the land to the proprietors,” the bench said.

Also, the panchayat will not have title over the land but as part of management and control, the panchayat is at liberty to put the land for the use for common purposes, the SC said.

“Neither the Punjab Village Common Lands Act, 1961 nor the Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1948 contemplates redistribution of land to the proprietors. It is an irrevocable act which cannot be undone. Thus, once land vests with the panchayat, it can be used for common purposes of the community and will never revert back to the proprietors,” the SC said, dismissing the appeals filed by proprietors.

It also ordered that writ petitions filed before the high court will also stand dismissed. The findings recorded by different benches of the high court are clearly erroneous and not sustainable, the SC said.


Link to access this article: https://www.hindustantimes.com/cities/chandigarh-news/sc-ruling-on-village-common-land-haryana-sets-timelines-for-restoration-of-illegally-sold-panchayat-land-101650568259460.html

Link to the original CfC post on the Supreme Court judgment: https://claim-for-commons.blogspot.com/2022/04/supreme-court-only-management-control.html

Sunday, April 10, 2022

Supreme Court: Village common land cannot be sold [08.04.2022]

No part of the village common land can be re-partitioned amongst the proprietors and such land would not be available for sale, the Supreme Court ruled.

Published on Apr 08, 2022 12:01 AM IST

Thousands of acres of village common land (shamilat deh) in Haryana sold off by shareholders or gram panchayat for monetary gains would get freed with the owners being ousted following a Supreme Court ruling on Thursday. The shamilat deh is reserved and used for common purposes.

A bench of Justices Hemant Gupta and V Ramasubramanian held that the entire land reserved for common purposes by applying pro-rata cut had to be utilised by the gram panchayat for the present and future needs of the village community. “No part of the land can be re-partitioned amongst the proprietors and such land would not be available for sale,’’ the apex court ruled.

The SC said the argument of the proprietors that the land which is not capable of being used for common purposes of the inhabitants of a village shall be reverted to the proprietors is untenable and unsustainable.

“The land has been put to common pool by applying pro-rata cut. Once pro-rata cut has been applied, the management and control of such land vest with the panchayat. There is no question of reverting the land to the proprietors,” the bench said. Also, the panchayat will not have title over the land but as part of management and control, the panchayat is at liberty to put the land for the use for common purposes, the SC said.

The SC said the land which is not part of the permissible limits under the land ceiling laws stand acquired and vested with the panchayat in terms of judgment in Ranjit Singh case. However, in respect of the land forming part of permissible limits of the proprietor under the land ceiling laws, the management and control vest with the panchayat.

“Neither the Punjab village common lands Act, 1961 nor the consolidation of holdings Act, 1948 contemplates redistribution of land to the proprietors. It is an irrevocable act which cannot be undone. Therefore, once land vests with the Panchayat, it can be used for common purposes of the community and will never revert back to the proprietors,’’ the SC said, dismissing the appeals filed by proprietors. It also ordered that writ petitions filed before the high court will also stand dismissed. The findings recorded by different benches of the high court are clearly erroneous and not sustainable, the SC said.



Link to access the article: 
https://www.hindustantimes.com/cities/chandigarh-news/village-common-land-cannot-be-sold-supreme-court-101649356307104.html#:~:text=%3A%20Thousands%20of%20acres%20of%20village,Supreme%20Court%20ruling%20on%20Thursday.

Links to access the full text of the judgment: 
1. https://www.livelaw.in/pdf_upload/supreme-court-amendment-act-414446.pdf 
2. https://main.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2003/16676/16676_2003_11_1501_34731_Judgement_07-Apr-2022.pdf

Saturday, December 18, 2021

Supreme Court of India on Encroachments: "All Major Cities Have Turned Into Slums" [16.12.2021]

The Supreme Court said, "Railways cannot be let off the hook of their responsibility. It is not just the state government's responsibility... The time has come for the corporations to take the responsibility of removing the encroachment".

The Indian Railways has to take responsibility for encroachments on its land and take strict action against them, the Supreme Court said today, refusing to allow 5000 hutments to continue in Gujarat."All major cities have turned into slums... This is a sad story going on for 75 years and we are celebrating the 75th year of Independence next year," said a three-judge bench, turning down an appeal from the slum dwellers to stop the demolition.

"Look at any city, Chandigarh might be an exception but there are problems in Chandigarh as well. That is happening everywhere. Let us rise to reality and think how the problem has to be resolved," said Justice AM Khanwilkar, who was on the bench along with Justices Dinesh Maheshwari and CT Ravikumar.

Directing the Railways to initiate criminal action against unauthorised occupants immediately, the court said, "Railways cannot be let off the hook of their responsibility. It is not just the state government's responsibility... The time has come for the corporations to take the responsibility of removing the encroachment". The court said it would also review the action taken.

The Railways have also been asked to take action against officials who have allowed the encroachments to take place.

"Performance will be apprised by us and not your hirers. Your liability is an equal liability along with the state and corporation. The owner who is incapable of protecting the property should be liable along with the State and Corporation," Justice Khanwilkar told Additional Solicitor General KM Nataraj, who was representing the Railways.

The order cleared the path for demolition of a huge swathe of hutments in Gujarat's Surat, that have come up on Railway land. The demolition will lead to the eviction of 10,000 people.

The court has asked the Gujarat government and the Railways to jointly provide a compensation of ₹ 2,000 per month for 6 months for each demolished hut. The money is for the people to manage accommodation till they are rehabilitated.

"The slum dwellers will be eligible for PMAY (Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana) accommodation if applications are made and eligibility is fulfilled," the court said.

The court had earlier stayed the demolition of the hutments, built along the railway track and issued notices to Centre, Western Railways and the state government.

In their appeal, the Surat-based 'Utran se Besthan Railway Jhopadpatti Vikas Mandal', said the slum dwellers will face irreparable injury if they are not provided with alternate arrangement. Once they are evicted and made homeless, their condition would become more miserable, especially in view of the pandemic, the petition had said.

Senior advocate Colin Gonsalves who appeared for the petitioners, said the people were living on Railway land for more than 60 years and most of them have proof of residence with them.

The Western Railways, he said, had planned a 10 km third railway line between Surat and Jalgaon and ordered the people to vacate the land without any notice or rehabilitation.


Link: https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/all-major-cities-have-turned-into-slums-supreme-court-on-encroachments-2655377

_______________________________________________________________________


SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 
 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS 

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) Diary No(s). 19714/2021 

(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 19-08-2021 in WPPIL No. 222/2014 passed by the High Court Of Gujarat At Ahmedabad) 

UTRAN SE BESTHAN RAILWAY JHOPADPATTI VIKAS MANDAL                      Petitioner(s) 

VERSUS 

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA & ORS.                                                                          Respondent(s) 


WITH Diary No(s). 23559/2021 

Date : 16-12-2021 

These petitions were called on for hearing today. 

CORAM : 
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.M. KHANWILKAR 
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DINESH MAHESHWARI 
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C.T. RAVIKUMAR 

For Petitioner(s)    Mr. Colin Gonsalves, Sr. Adv. 
Ms. Kawalpreet Kaur, Adv. 
Ms. Hetvi Patel, Adv. 
Mr. Haider Ali, Adv. 
Mr. Satya Mitra, AOR
Ms. Amiy Shukla, AOR 

For Respondent(s) Mr. Tushar Mehta, SG 
MR. K. M. Nataraj, ASG 
Mr. Kanu Agarwal, Adv 
Mr. Akshay Amritanshu, Adv 
Mr. Sanskriti Pathak, Adv 
Mr. Varun Chaugh, Adv 
Mr. Amrish Kumar, AOR 

Mr. K M Nataraj, Ld ASG. 
Mr. Vatsal joshi, Adv. 
Mr. Vikas Bansal, Adv. 
Mr. S.K Singhania, Adv. 
Mr. Sughosh Subramanyam, Adv. 
Mr. Amrish Kumar, AOR 
Mr. Arun Bhardwaj, Sr. Adv. 
Mr. Rahul Kumar Sharma, Adv.  
 Ms. Deepanwita Priyanka, AOR 
Mr. Munawwar Naseem, AOR 
Mr. Dhaval Nanavati, 
Mrs. Ruchi Khurana 
Ms. Sanjna Dua, Advocates 

UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following 
O R D E R 

Diary No(s). 19714/2021 

This special leave petition takes exception to the judgment and order dated 19.08.2021 in Writ Petition (PIL) No. 222 of 2014 whereby the cause espoused by the petitioners in the public interest litigation, of the occupants of the structures occupied by the concerned persons on Railway property came to be rejected by the High Court. 

The fact that the structures are standing on the Railway property is not disputed at all. Their plea is only to provide suitable rehabilitation in lieu of the premises occupied by the concerned persons on the Railway property. 

The respondent-Western Railways, at the outset asserts that it has not formulated any scheme much less for rehabilitation of persons who have encroached upon the Railway property. In fact, it is an offence to encroach upon any Railway property. Further, they want to execute a public project of linking of railway line between Surat-Udhna upto Jalgaon (Third Railway Line Project). That project is being obstructed by unauthorised structures on the Railway property. The project, though sanctioned in the year 2018, is still incomplete because of the standing structures on the Railway property to the extent of 2.65 kilometers length. The total length of project is 10 kilometers and requiring a width of 25 meters all along. 

As regards the operative order passed by the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad, rejecting the public interest litigation, we do not wish to deviate from that conclusion. However, the question is about rehabilitation of the occupants of the concerned structures, which are likely to be removed due to the proposed action of demolition by Western Railways. 

According to Western Railways, the primary responsibility to ensure that no encroachment takes place on any property is that of the local Government and also of the State Government, in equal measure.

Although, the submission seems to be attractive at the first blush, does not commend to us. For, there is a special enactment which enables the Railway authorities to protect its property. That is its statutory and public trust obligation. It was open to the concerned Authority to invoke the provisions of special enactment including the Public Premises Act. For that, the Estate Officers should have moved into action in right earnest at the earliest opportunity. Even that option is not being invoked for reasons best known to the Authorities. Besides, the Railway establishment maintains a Railway police force whose services could be utilized to safeguard the Railways property, wherever it is situated. 

As a result, the nuanced distinction made by the learned counsel for Western Railways does not commend to us. We hold that the Railways are equally responsible for the situation; and for which reason, it is also equally liable to provide some support to the persons likely to be affected by the removal of their structures. 

Hence, keeping in mind the dictum of this Court in Ahemadabad Municipal Corporation Vs. Nawab Khan Gulab Khan reported in (1997) 11 SCC 121, on that analogy, we propose to issue following directions: 

(i) The respondent – Western Railways do immediately issue notices to the occupants of the concerned structures which are falling within the belt which is required immediately for commencing the remaining project work by giving two weeks' time to the concerned occupant(s) to vacate the respective premises; 

(ii) In respect of the remaining land owned by Railways, even though it may not be immediately required for the project, similar notice be given to the occupants of structures standing thereon by giving six weeks’ time to vacate the respective premises; 

(iii) In either case (i) and (ii) above, the notices be issued within one week from today and if the occupants fail to vacate the unauthorized structure, it will be open to the respondent-Western Railways to initiate appropriate action to forcibly dispossess them and to demolish or remove the unauthorized structure(s) by taking assistance of the local police force. The Superintendent/Commissioner of Police of the concerned area shall ensure that adequate police force is deployed on the site and surrounding areas including to provide protection to the officials/staff engaged in the demolition of unauthorized structures and to facilitate them to commence the eviction process and demolition of the unauthorized structures, referred to in the eviction notices on the specified date and time; 

(iv) Before commencing the process of eviction and removal of the structures, the Collector of the concerned District must ensure that necessary details about the names and number of persons occupying the concerned structure, including their identity and profile should be duly recorded, which record should be preserved by the Collector for considering the eligibility of those persons for being provided suitable residential accommodation after being evicted owning to proposed demolition action; 

(v) The entity, who is the owner of the land, namely, Western Railways in this case as well as the local Government and the State Government shall be jointly and severally liable to pay a sum of Rs. 2,000/- per month per demolished structure for a period of six months from the date of demolition of their structure as ex-gratia amount to the head of the family/occupants unauthorized structure of the removed concerned during demolition action. That amount shall be initially paid by the Collector for a period of six months “only” (not beyond six months each) and shall be later on shared equally by the entity (owner of the land), local Government and State Government; 

(vi) In the event, the local Government has any rehabilitation scheme, the affected persons may apply for being rehabilitated under the said scheme, if eligible and subject to verification of eligibility and complying with all other terms and conditions of the prevalent scheme. The local Government may provide them suitable residential accommodation in lieu of rehabilitation owing to demolition of their structure. 

(vii) If no rehabilitation scheme has been formulated by the local Government or is in force, the persons likely to be affected by the action of demolition can apply for allocation of residential premises under the Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojna Scheme, which application be processed not later than six months from the date of its receipt and taken to its logical end, application-wise within such period. 

(viii) Be it a case of rehabilitation under clause (vi) or (vii) above, the persons affected by demolition action by the Authorities cannot insist for allotment of alternative residential accommodation at the same place from where they have been evicted (as it is not in situ rehabilitation programme). The eligible persons be allotted accommodation wherever available in the same or even in neighbouring districts. 

(ix) In addition, since the Railways have power to initiate civil/criminal action against the unauthorized occupants on the Railway property, must resort to those proceedings against the concerned persons immediately after it is brought to the notice to the concerned official of the Railways. Further, the Railways being the owner of the property, as also the local Government and State Government must initiate appropriate action against the erring persons, including the officials of the concerned establishment for allowing and tolerating such encroachment and for not taking corrective action of removal of encroachments in right earnest and at the earliest opportunity. 

(x) The status report of the action taken by the Railway Board as also by the local Government and State Government be furnished to this Court before the next date. 

List this matter on 28.01.2022. 

In the meantime, learned counsel for the petitioner to cure the defects as pointed by the Registry. 

Diary No(s). 23559/2021 

The order passed in Diary No(s). 19714/2021 will operate even in this special leave petition, only qua the ten structures of the concerned petitioners herein. 

Mr. Colin Gonsalves, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner points out that one more petition has been filed by the affected persons before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana being Writ Petition No.19647 of 2021, involving similar issues. The same is withdrawn and shall stand transferred to this Court in terms of this order. 

List the transferred case and this petition along with Diary No. 19714 of 2021 on 28.01.2022. 

In the meantime, learned counsel for the petitioner to cure the defects as pointed by the Registry. 

Monday, September 13, 2021

Supreme Court of India in Rameshbhai Virabhai Chaudhari vs. State of Gujarat [06.09.2021]

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5135 OF 2021 
(Arising out of SLP(CIVIL) No. 14222/2019) 


RAMESHBHAI VIRABHAI CHAUDHARI                                                  APPELLANT(s) 

VERSUS 

THE STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.                                                           RESPONDENT(S) 

O R D E R 

Leave granted. The appellant seeks to assail the order dated 12.04.2019 passed by the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court on a public interest litigation filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking removal of unauthorized encroachment on the gauchar land of Village Bhandu (Laxmipura),Taluka: Visnagar, District: Mehsana, belonging to Gram panchayat/Government. The petition was dismissed after obtaining affidavit in reply predicated on a reasoning that all the people who are unauthorizedly occupying are from the low income strata of society and are residing there since number of years and thus it would not be appropriate to direct their immediate removal unless alternative accommodation is provided to them by the State and its authorities in accordance with its policy. 

On notice being issued, counter affidavit has been filed by respondent No. 6, Sarpanch of the Panchayat. No doubt a preliminary submission has been raised that even the brother of the appellant is one of the persons who has encroached in the gouchar Land but then that only implies that he has to be treated at par with anybody else who may have encroached. 

In our view, what is material is that on survey being conducted, 72 persons have been found to have made encroachment in the gouchar land being Survey Nos in question bearing Nos. 1938/1, 198/2 and 1939. Out of these persons, 3 persons are included in scheduled caste category and the 2 persons are Socially Economically Backward Class. The Scheduled caste persons concerned are stated to have already got benefit of another Government Scheme namely, Amedkar Aavas Yojana. The other encroachers are having residential houses at other places along with agricultural lands adjacent thereto and are thus not entitled to get any alternative accommodation. The land in question is being used for making shelters for their cattle and not being used for residential purposes. In fact on 07.08.2019, 29 persons are stated to have made a statement that they were keeping cattle on the land while other persons did not appear. Thus only three persons are entitled to the alternative accommodation as stated above. Out of these, one person is stated to be doing ritualistic puja called Pujari and other two persons are stated to be under SEBC category and also coming under poverty line. 

In respect of user of the gouchar land, it is stated that Government is running Anganvadi, school in the said premises. One cooperative society is running dairy and there is one temple of Hanumanji. 

It is trite to say that gouchar land can be used only for purposes for which it is permitted to be used. If there is a user contrary to the permissible user, whether by the State or by any third party, the same cannot go on. Rehabilitation of persons is really not required in the present case as only three persons are entitled to an alternative site as per rules. There is of course some dispute whether the encroachers have made permanent structures or kuchha construction for keeping cattle but be that as it may, the user cannot be contrary to what is being permitted for gouchar land, which is a grazing land. 

In view of the aforesaid, a direction is issued to bring the land in conformity with its use by the State Government taking appropriate action within a maximum period of three months from today. 

The impugned order is set aside with the direction aforesaid and the appeal is, accordingly, allowed. The parties to bear their own costs. 

The Compliance report be filed by the State Government within two weeks thereafter, to be verified by the Registrar of this Court. 


                ....................J.                                                                      ...................J. 
       [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL]                                                [M.M. SUNDRESH]
 

NEW DELHI, 
SEPTEMBER 06, 2021

Wednesday, March 10, 2021

Supreme Court of India: Jitendra Singh v. Ministry of Environment [Order dated 25.11.2019]

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5109 OF 2019 


Jitendra Singh                                                                                         ..... Appellants(s) 

 VERSUS 

Ministry of Environment & Ors.                                                           .....Respondents(s) 


 JUDGMENT


SURYA KANT, J.

1. The instant statutory appeal has been preferred under Section 22 of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 (hereinafter “NGT Act”) against the order dated 06.03.2019 of the Principal Bench of the National Green Tribunal (“NGT”), whereby appellant’s grievance against allotment of local ponds to private industrialists has been dismissed summarily without any adjudication of the lis or merits, but merely on the basis of an affidavit filed by Respondent No. 5 (Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority – hereinafter “GNIDA”) claiming that it was developing bigger alternative water­bodies.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

2. The appellant is a permanent resident of village Saini, tehsil Dadri, of district Gautam Budh Nagar, which falls in the National Capital Region. He claims to be a socially­ active lawyer dedicated to bettering the lives of his co­villagers and alleges that the Original Application before the NGT was triggered when around 18.01.2017 the agents of a private entity (Respondent No. 6 ­ M/s Sharp Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. ­ hereinafter “Sharp”) using excavataors and other heavy machinery attempted to forcibly takeover possession of a ‘common­ pond’, which had been in use by local villagers for a century. This was objected to by the villagers, and the appellant subsequently made a complaint on 25.01.2017 to various authorities including the District Collector. Pointing out revenue records which elucidate the commons­ status of the ponds, he sought directions to restrain Sharp and its agents. However, there was no action on his representation for more than 10 days, leading to another attempt by Sharp at dispossession, compelling the appellant to seek police help. A few days later, he submitted another representation to the Collector, but to no avail. Aggrieved, he was left with no recourse but to approach the NGT by way of an Original Application under Section 14 (read with Sections 15 and 18) of the NGT Act for adjudication of these environmental issues.

3. Before the Tribunal, appellant contended that large tracts of his village (but not the impugned water­bodies) had been acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ostensibly for industrial development by GNIDA. Subsequently, these acquired lands (including some local ponds) had been leased to private industrialists, including Sharp in 2012. Using revenue records obtained under the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act, appellant showed that Khasra Nos. 552 (1140 sq meters) and 490 (8470 sq meters) were ‘pokhar’ (pond) and Khasra Nos. 522 (1620 sq meters) and 676 (9804 sq metres) were ‘rajwaha’ (canal). Highlighting that the water bodies were vested in the Gram Sabhas per Section 117 of the UP Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, he contended that such land had neither been acquired, nor resumed and hence there was no power with GNIDA to transfer the same to Sharp. He further claimed to have discovered other similar illegal allotments of water bodies by GNIDA to other third­parties.

4. The appellant urged that neither the mandatory environmental clearances under the Environmental (Protection) Act, 1984 had been obtained by the industrialists nor the statutory authorities applied their mind that the project would negatively impact the environment and human health. Laying support on the Ramsar Convention and Rule 4 of the Wetland (Conservation and Management) Rules, 2010 which prohibited reclamation of wetlands, setting up or expansion of industries, permanent construction or any other activity with potentially adverse effects on ecosystem, he sought cancellation of such illegal allotments and protection of water­bodies.

5. During pendency of the proceedings, GNIDA’s representatives started filing up certain ponds and started developing an alternate area (1.25 times bigger) as a new waterbody to save the allotment made in favour of Sharp (as admitted in an additional affidavit filed before the NGT on 15.01.2019 by GNIDA).

6. Over the course of proceedings, the appellant was permitted to amend his prayers in the Original Application to enable challenge to all illegalities concerning village commons. No rejoinder or additional affidavit was filed by any respondent against the amended Original Application.

7. The NGT vide its brief impugned order dated 06.03.2019 took note of this representation of constructing alternate pond and abruptly concluded that appellant’s substantial grievance had been redressed. It accordingly dismissed his application, without venturing into the merits or the lis of the dispute.

CONTENTIONS OF PARTIES

8. This summary dismissal by the NGT has been challenged before us. Appellant raises grievance against the manner in which the NGT, without even looking at the sweep of his prayers, disposed off the mater before it, merely on the strength of a proposed affidavit (which was actually filed only on 12.03.2019, post adjudication of the application by the NGT and without any advance copy to the appellant). He further protests the haste with which his application was disposed of and how the reluctance by the NGT to conduct even a proper enquiry has resulted in conferrment of illegal benefits to third­ parties, at the cost to the environment and local residents.

9. The appellant contends that the disputed pond is situated near the Aravali hills which are in an arid zone with a low­water table. He demonstrated how the existing sparse flaura and fauna in the region was hence unlikely to survive elsewhere. Highlighting the unchecked urbanisation and construction of concrete jungles in the ecologically sensitive area, the appellant alleged that Respondent ­authorities were in active connivance with industrialists and real estate companies, were negligently discharging their duties. This, he contended, violated public trust and consequently the right to a wholesome environment guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. Interpreting Article 48A and Article 51­A(g) to place a duty on the State to protect the environment, including lakes and water­bodies, the appellant has sought intervention of this Court to save and restore the local ponds.

10. Per contra, learned Counsel for GNIDA (Respondent No. 5) placed reliance on a Government Order dated 03.06.2016, which he claimed permitted destruction of existing ponds and allotment of filled­up land to third­parties in certain extraordinary circumstances, with the stipulation that 25%­larger alternate water­bodies be developed elsewhere. Further, he questioned recording of Khasra Nos. 552 and 490 as ‘pokhar’ in revenue record, contending that it was merely ‘slightly low lying land’ over which some water would get accumulated during rainy season. There was statedly no water on the pond­land since the past year, showing that it was merely ordinary in nature. Even if ‘pokhar’, Khasra Nos. 552 was only 1140 sq. meters in size, which constituted a miniscule portion (only 1.4%) of the total allotted plot of 80,900 sq. meters. It was also explained that no other ‘pokhar’ had been included and Khasra No. 490 had not been allotted to Sharp. GNIDA also put forth a contrary allegation that the appellant was, in fact, aggrieved by non­disbursement of compensation and had set up the entire dispute as a rouse to stall development of the area so that he could instead use it for his private purpose of cattle grazing.

11. Sharp (Respondent No. 6) has averred that the disputed land was no longer vested in the Gram Sabha as the UP Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 had been repealed by the UP Revenue Code, 2006. This new Code specified that title of all lands including lakes, ponds, tanks, streams and nallas vest in the State Government. Through Section 59 of the Code, the land was merely entrusted to the Gram Panchayat, and the State retained power to alter such entrustment at any time. It claimed to have paid Rs 25 crores as sale consideration for leasehold rights over acquired areas and is allegedly suffering as a result of litigation­induced delays. 

ANALYSIS & FINDINGS

12. At the outset, we must note, that the respondents have been unable to demonstrate how the 2016 Government Order can be made applicable retrospectively, the possession having been given to Sharp in 2012. Notwithstanding this, no case of the present instance being an extraordinary circumstance (hence permitting recourse to the exceptional provisions of the Government Order) has been made before us either. Further, argument that Khasra No. 552 is a ‘slightly ­sloped seasonal rainfall­ catchment area’ and not a ‘pond’, is creative but without merit. Photographs have been placed on record by the appellant showing that there is substantial water in the pond, which has not been controverted. Further, revenue records maintained by the Revenue Department themselves show that the land was ‘pokhar’. It is hence not open for the authorities to contradict and plead against the record without any scientific or empirical support, for such categorisation had been made by them in the past. Further, it was conceded by respondent ­authorities during arguments that Khasra No. 490 was also recorded as ‘pokhar’ in revenue records and that it too had been integrated in the industrial development project.

13. Additionally, it is clear that repeal of the UP Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 and vesting of such ponds and local areas in the State by Section 57 of the UP Revenue Code, 2006 would not by itself either change the nature of land contrary to revenue record nor will defeat the long­ established rights of the local people on commons. Such a proposition had unequivocally been laid down in Chigurupati Venkata Subbayya v. Palaguda Anjayya, where this Court negatived a contention that communal rights in the suit­land stood abolished per Section 3 of the Estates Abolition Act, 1948 for it provided that estates, including communal lands, would stand transferred to the Government free from any encumbrance. Further, it was held that even explicit destruction of all rights and interests created by the principal or landholders, would not apply to community rights as such rights originated elsewhere.

14. Given that Section 22 of the NGT Act, 2010 specifies that the nature of the appeal shall be akin to a second appeal as specified under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, we would restrict our deliberation to a singular substantive question of law. That is, whether it is permissible for the State to alienate common water­ bodies for industrial activities, under the guise of providing alternatives?

15. In Hinch Lal Tiwari v. Kamala Devi, this Court settled that ‘ponds’ were a public utility meant for common use and held that they could not be allotted or commercialised. It had refused to give any weight to similar arguments of the pond having become levelled, with merely some portion getting covered during rainy season by water. Importantly, it emphasised that:

“13. It is important to notice that the material resources of the community like forests, tanks, ponds, hillock, mountain etc. are nature's bounty. They maintain delicate ecological balance. They need to be protected for a proper and healthy environment which enables people to enjoy a quality life which is the essence of the guaranteed right under Article 21 of the Constitution. The Government, including the Revenue Authorities i.e. Respondents 11 to 13, having noticed that a pond is falling in disuse, should have bestowed their attention to develop the same which would, on one hand, have prevented ecological disaster and on the other provided better environment for the benefit of the public at large. Such vigil is the best protection against knavish attempts to seek allotment in non­abadi sites.”

16. This Court reiterated in Jagpal Singh v. State of Punjab and noted that since time immemorial, certain common lands had vested in village communities for collective benefit. Except in exceptional circumstances when used exclusively for the downtrodden, these lands were inalienable. It was observed that such protections, however, remained on paper, and since Independence powerful people and a corrupt system had appropriated these lands for personal aggrandizement. Pointing out the harms in allowing such misappropriation, the Court noted an urgent public interest in stopping such misdeeds. Further, various directions were issued for eviction of illegal occupants and restoration of the common land to villagers. It was explicitly specified that “long duration of such illegal occupation or huge expenditure in making constructions thereon” cannot be a “justification for condoning this illegal act or for regularising the illegal possession”.

17. It is uncontroverted, in the present case, that the Government Order dated 03.06.2016 was a consequence of the afore­cited judgment in Jagpal Singh. Curiously, however, Clause 5 of the Government Order carves an exception of “huge projects/works” (albeit in extraordinary circumstances) to Jagpal Singh’s strict principle of non­alienation of common water­bodies. It is clear that such ground of exception doesn’t fall under the limited class of grants to “landless labourers or members of the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes, or where there is already a school, dispensary or other public utility on the land”. Such industrial activities without any rationale classification, unlike the narrow class exempted, do not serve a social public purpose or benefit the local people, and thus will be hit by the inalienability bar.

18. Even otherwise, the action of the respondent­ authorities contravenes their Constitutional obligations. Article 48­A of the Constitution casts a duty on the State to “endeavour to protect and improve the environment and to safeguard the forests and wild life of the country”, and Article 51­A(g) expects every citizen to perform his fundamental duty to “protect and improve the natural environment”. A perusal of our Constitutional scheme and judicial development of environmental law further shows that all persons have a right to a healthy environment. It would be gainsaid that the State is nothing but a collective embodiment of citizens, and hence collective duties of citizens can constructively be imposed on the State. Such an interpretation of the Constitution has also been adopted in MC Mehta v. Union of India wherein this Court mandated the State to ensure mandatory environemental education to all school students in pursuance of the fundamental duties ensrined in Article 51­A(g):
“24. Having regard to the grave consequences of the pollution of water and air and the need for protecting and improving the natural environment which is considered to be one of the fundamental duties under the Constitution (vide Clause (g) of Article 51A of the Constitution) we are of the view that it is the duty of the Central Government to direct all the educational institutions throughout India to teach atleast for one hour in a week lessons relating to the protection and the improvement of the natural environment including forests, lakes, rivers and wildlife in the first ten classes. The Central Government shall get text books written for the said purpose and distribute them to the educational institutions free of cost. Children should be taught about the need for maintaining cleanliness commencing with the cleanliness of the house both inside and outside, and of the streets in which they live. Clean surroundings lead to healthy body and healthy mind. Training of teachers who teach this subject by the introduction of short term courses for such training shall also be considered. This should be done throughout India.”

19. There remains therefore no doubt that it is the responsibility of the respondents to ensure the protection and integrity of the environment, especially one which is a source for livelihood for rural population and life for local flaura and fauna.

20. Protection of such village­ commons is essential to safeguard the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 21 of our Constitution. These common areas are the lifeline of village communities, and often sustain various chores and provide resources necessary for life. Waterbodies, specifically, are an important source of fishery and much needed potable water. Many areas of this country perennially face a water crisis and access to drinking water is woefully inadequate for most Indians. Allowing such invaluable community resources to be taken over by a few is hence grossly illegal.

21. The respondents’ scheme of allowing destruction of existing water bodies and providing for replacements, exhibits a mechanical application of environmental protection. Although it might be possible to superficially replicate a waterbody elsewhere, however, there is no guarantee that the adverse effect of destroying the earlier one would be offset. Destroying the lake at Khasra Nos. 552 and 490, for example, would kill the vegetation around it and would prevent seepage of groundwater which would affect the already low water­table in the area. The people living around the lake would be compelled to travel all the way to the alternative site, in this case allegedly almost 3 kms away. Many animals and marine organisms present in the earlier site would perish, and wouldn’t resuscitate by merely filling a hole with water elsewhere. Further, the soil quality and other factors at the alternate site might not be conducive to growth of the same flora, and the local environment would be altered permanently. The respondents’ reduction of the complex and cascading effects of extinguishing natural water­bodies into mere numbers and their attempt to justify the same through replacement by geographically larger artificial water­ bodies, fails to capture the spirit of the Constitutional scheme and is, therefore, impermissible.

22. Hence, it is clear that schemes which extinguish local waterbodies albeit with alternatives, as provided in the 2016 Government Order by the State of UP, are violative of Constitutional principles and are liable to be struck down.

23. For the reasons stated above, we allow the appeal and set aside the impugned order passed by the NGT. The allotment of all water bodies (both ponds and canals), including Khasra Nos. 552 and 490 to Respondent No. 6, or any other similar third party in village Saini, tehsil Dadari, district Gautam Budh Nagar is held to be illegal and the same is hereby quashed. Since this Court has on 15.07.2019 already directed the parties to maintain status quo, Respondent Nos. 1 to 5 shall restore, maintain and protect the subject ­water bodies in village Saini. Respondents are further directed to remove all obstructions from the catchment area through which natural water accumulates in the village ponds, all within a period of three months.


                        (SURYA JANT), J.                            (ARUN MISHRA), J.