Delhi District Court in Rameshwar v. Gaon Sabha of Village Jhatkira [Order dated 22.04.2019]

IN THE COURT OF SH. HARGURVARINDER SINGH JAGGI, 

ADDL. DISTRICT JUDGE - 02, 

SOUTH WEST, DWARKA COURTS, NEW DELHI 

RCA No. 54677/2016 

CNR No. DLSW01-000866-2016 

IN THE MATTER OF: 

1. Rameshwar S/o Late Bhondu Ram R/o Village Jhatikra Delhi 

... Appellant No. 1/Plaintiff 

2. Kailash Kumar S/o Late Lakhi Ram R/o Village Jhatikra Delhi 

... Appellant No. 2/Defendant No. 4 

3. Mukesh Kumar S/o Late Lakhi Ram R/o Village Jhatikra Delhi 

... Appellant No. 3/Defendant No. 5 

Versus 

1. Gaon Sabha of Village Jhatikra Through Block Development Officer, South West BDO, Office Najafgarh Delhi 

... Respondent No. 1/Defendant No. 1 

2. Union of India Through Secretary Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt. of India New Delhi 

 ... Respondent No. 2/Defendant No. 2 

3. The Development Commissioner Govt. of NCT of Delhi 5, Sham Nath Marg Delhi

... Respondent No. 3/Defendant No. 3 

Date of filing of appeal : 21.01.2016 

Date of reserving judgment : 05.03.2019 

Date of pronouncement of judgment : 22.04.2019 

JUDGMENT

1. This is an appeal against the impugned judgment and decree dated 09.12.2015 passed by the Ld. Senior Civil Judge (Central), Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi in a civil suit titled as Rameshwar v. Gaon Sabha of Village Jhatikra & Ors. - C.S. No. 790/2016 (hereinafter collectively referred to as the "impugned judgment"). The appeal against impugned judgment is preferred by the appellants namely, Rameshwar, Kailash Kumar and Mukesh Kumar (hereinafter "the appellants").

2. The appellant No. 1/plaintiff, namely, Rameshwar had instituted a suit for declaration and permanent injunction seeking a declaratory decree that the ejectment order dated 08.03.1999 passed by the Revenue Assistant, Najafgarh in the proceedings under Section 86A of the Delhi Land Reforms, Act, 1954 (hereinafter "the Act") be declared null and void and not binding upon the plaintiff along with a permanent injunction restraining the defendant from dispossessing the plaintiff from the immovable property being an agricultural land admeasuring 13 Bighas and 13Biswas under Khasra Nos. 31/11 (4-12), 20 (4-12), and 21 (4-9) in the revenue estate of village Jhatikra, Delhi (hereinafter "suit property").

3. The parties are referred to their rank and position before the trial court for the sake of convenience and clarity.

4. The facts of the case in a nutshell are that one Bhondu Ram, was the father of the plaintiff namely, Rameshwar (plaintiff) and Lakhi Ram (deceased). On Lakhi Ram being predeceased son of Bhondu Ram, the plaintiff impleaded his sons namely, Kailash Kumar, as defendant No. 4) and Mukesh Kumar, as defendant No. 5, as they refused to join the plaintiff in instituting the suit before the trial court.

5. The father of the plaintiff namely, Bhondu Ram, who was the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff namely, Rameshwar was in actual, physical possession of suit property and the suit property was cultivated by Bhondu Ram during his lifetime. Bhondu Ram was in the possession of the suit property I.e agricultural land prior to the consolidation of holding operations in the year 1972-73. Bhondu Ram died on 20.04.2000 and thereafter, the plaintiff being a successor-in-interest came in actual physical possession of suit property on death of Bhondu Ram.

6. In the year 1983, proceedings under Section 86A of the Act were initiated against Bhondu Ram before the Ld. SDM/Revenue Assistant. The said proceedings were transferred from Patiala House to Najafgarh, however, no notice of such transfer was given to Bhondu Ram. An ejectment order dated 08.03.1999 was passed by the concerned Revenue Assistant on the basis of a Halka Patwari's report against Bhondu Ram in Case No. 07/1983.

7. The plaintiff assailed the order dated 08.03.1999 passed by the concerned Revenue Assistant by institution of a suit for declaration and permanent injunction. The case of the plaintiff before the trial court was that the order dated 08.03.1999 is bad, as Bhondu Ram had become a bhumidhar by operation of law, as Gaon Sabha, Village Jhatikra failed to file any ejectment proceedings within the stipulated period. The ejectment order dated 08.03.1999 casted cloud not only over the rights, title but also possession of the suit property, hence, the plaintiff had no other option but to institute a suit for declaration and permanent injunction against the defendants. The plaintiff before the trial court laid the edifice of his case on the ground that the consolidation proceedings were completed in the year 1972-73 and accordingly, the proceedings initiated on the basis of the Halka Patwari's report under Section 86A of the Act were barred by limitation, as the same were initiated beyond the prescribed period in the Act.

8. The defendant No. 1 - 3 (respondent Nos. 1 - 3 herein) filed a joint written statement and challenged the claim of the plaintiff. The main plank of the defendant Nos. 1 - 3 defence before the trial court was that the suit instituted by the plaintiff was barred by law, as the same was hit by the embargo under Section 185 of the Act.

9. The trial court framed three issues on 01.11.2001 and out of the three issues, the issue No. 1 was treated as a preliminary issue. It is observed that the trial court after expiry of 7 years and 6 months held that evidence must be led for adjudication of the issues and accordingly, the trial court vide order dated 23.05.2009, proceeded the case for plaintiff's evidence.

10. The trial court vide impugned judgment dismissed the suit instituted by the plaintiff. The trial court in the impugned judgment held that the suit instituted by the plaintiff is hit by the embargo under Section 185 of the Act and the suit of the plaintiff against the defendants was not maintainable.

11. One of the grounds urged by the appellant in the present appeal assailing the impugned judgment are that the trial court passed the impugned judgment, contrary to the law and facts of the case. The appellant has also urged the ground that the trial court failed to appreciate the facts, as well as law, applicable to the facts of the given case, as the trial court illegally and wrongly decided the issue No. 1 by holding that the civil court has no jurisdiction, as the jurisdiction of the civil court is barred by Section 185 of the Act. The appellant urged that such an interpretation of law by the trial court is erroneous and fallacious.

12. The appellant has also urged the ground that the trial court gravely erred in law by not appreciating the provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. The appellant has urged the ground that the trial court went astray considering the provisions of Section 86A of the Act, in as much as admittedly, the proceedings under Section 86A of the Act were initiated on a complaint of a Halka Patwari in the year 1983. The plaintiff in the suit had clearly claimed possession over the suit property with effect from 1970 i.e. prior to the commencement of the consolidation proceedings in village Jhatikra. The appellant has urged that the trial court failed to appreciate that the proceedings initiated in the year 1983 were clearly barred by time and which objection had been categorically taken by the predecessor-in-interest of the appellant/plaintiff in reply to the aforesaid proceedings.

13. The appellant in the memorandum of appeal has also urged the ground that the Revenue Assistant failed to take notice of the objections and without applying his judicial mind passed the order dated 08.03.1999 in a mechanical manner without even considering and dealing with the issue of maintainability of the proceedings in view of the provisions of Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

14. The appellant has urged the ground in his appeal that the trial court incorrectly appreciated the ratio of the judgment titled as Gaon Sabha Budhela v. Dharam Singh - 25 (1985) DLT 394. The trial court not only erred by distinguishing the aforesaid judgment passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Gaon Sabha Budhela v. Dharam Singh (supra) but also failed to consider the provisions of Rule 5 and Rule 170 of the Delhi Land Reforms Rules, 1954, framed under the Act i.e. Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954. The appellant has urged that though Section 86A of the Act provides the procedure for an ejectment of a person occupying the land without title but Section 86A of the Act, nowhere makes any distinction between agriculture land and abadi land. Section 86A of the Act deals with the ejectment of a person, who is in occupation of the Gaon Sabha and who has to be ejected after following the procedure as prescribed under the Act. The appellant has urged in the appeal that the proceedings under Section 86A of the Act, are to be initiated within the period of limitation, as provided in the said Act. The limitation period for initiating such proceedings under Section 86A of the Act is 3(three) years from the date of commencement of the occupation. The appellant/plaintiff has urged in the appeal that it is the case of the appellant that in the year 1983 no such proceedings under Section 86A of the Act were initiated by the concerned Revenue Assistant against the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff. In short, the trial court failed to even consider the issue of limitation, as such the order dated 08.03.1999 was a nullity in the eyes of law, as the same was passed without following the due process procedure culled out under Rule 170 of the Delhi Land Reforms Rules, 1954.

15. The appellant has also urged the ground that trial court erred in holding that the little difference in facts or additional facts may make a lot of difference in precedent value of a decision and the trial court wrongly applied the ratio of the judgments Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mills (P) Ltd. (2003) 2 SCC 111 and Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. N.R. Vairamani (2004) 8 SCC 579.

16. Lastly, the appellant has urged the ground that the trial court wrongly held that the jurisdiction of civil court is barred under Section 185 of the Act, and consequentially grave prejudice has been caused to the appellants on passing of the impugned judgment by the trial court, as the trial court failed to consider the issue on merits and solely on the basis of its finding on issue No. 1, decided the issue No. 2 against the plaintiff (appellant No. 1 herein) and defendant No. 4 and 5 (appellant Nos. 2 and 3, respectively).

17. The oral argument for the appellants were advanced by Sh. N.K. Tyagi and for respondents by Sh. Vikram Singh Girsa, Ld. counsels for the parties on 22.02.2019 and 05.03.2019.

18. Sh. Tyagi, Ld. counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant/plaintiff is the cultivator of the suit property and the khasra gridawari duly reflects not only the name of the appellant but also that of his father Bhondu Ram, as a cultivator of the suit property. Ld. counsel for the appellant further submitted that the order dated 08.03.1999 passed by the Ld. SDM/Revenue Assistant under Section 86A of the Act is bad in law and thus, the impugned judgment and passed by the trial court is liable to be set aside, as the trial court failed to appreciate the correct position in law.

19. Sh. Tyagi, Ld. counsel for the appellant strenuously argued that the suit before the trial court i.e. civil court, was very well maintainable, as the plaintiff (appellant No. 1 herein) had instituted the suit assailing the order dated 08.03.1999 under Rule 170(6) of the Delhi Land Reform Rules, 1954 framed under the Act. Ld. counsel with great emphasis submitted that the word 'suit' has not been defined under the Act and the Rules framed thereunder and thus, the word 'suit' in Rule 170(6) means a suit before civil court.

20. Per contra, Sh. Girsa, Ld. counsel for the respondents submitted that the impugned judgment arises out of a suit filed by the plaintiff/appellant No. 1, who is one of the sons of Bhondu Ram. Ld. counsel further submitted that Sh. Bhondu Ram during his lifetime never initiated any legal proceeding assailing the order dated 08.03.1999 passed by the concerned Revenue Assistant. Ld. counsel for the respondents further submitted that the trial court rightly dismissed the suit instituted by the plaintiff, as the same was not maintainable in the eyes of law. Ld. counsel further submitted that Bhondu Ram was very well alive at the time of passing of the order dated 08.03.1999. Ld. counsel for the respondents further submitted that Bhondu Ram (father of the plaintiff) died on 20.04.2000, as per the provisions of the Act and applicable Rules, the order dated 08.03.1999 was neither challenged by the father of the plaintiff nor by the plaintiff (appellant No. 1 herein) within the prescribed period and to the contrary, the plaintiff instituted the suit on 20.07.2001. Ld. counsel for the respondents submitted that the very suit in which the impugned judgment has been passed by the trial court and the same challenged by the plaintiff (appellants) by way of present appeal, was not filed by Bhondu Ram but by the plaintiff. In short, the plaintiff/appellant cannot be permitted in the eyes of law to cover the lacuna of assailing the order dated 08.03.1999 within the prescribed period by instituting a suit for declaration and permanent injunction and enhancing the prescribed period to 3 years. Ld. counsel for the respondents submitted that the order dated 08.03.1999 had long gained finality and the same cannot be usurped by the appellants herein by way of the suit and/or the present appeal. Ld. counsel for the respondents submitted that regardless, the trial court rightly dismissed the suit of the plaintiff, as the same was barred by Section 185 of the Act.

21. Sh. Girsa, Ld. counsel for the respondents further submitted that the suit property in question is an agricultural land. Thus, the judgment of Gaon Sabha Budhela v. Dharam Singh - 25 (1985) DLT 394 relied upon by the plaintiff before the trial court was rightly distinguished by the trial court, as in the judgment of Gaon Sabha Budhela (supra), the land in question was an abadi land, and whereas in the present case the land in question is an agricultural land. Sh. Girsa, Ld. counsel for the respondents further submitted that the name of the plaintiff is not recorded in the revenue records and thus the entire claim of the plaintiff and/or appellants is baseless. Ld. counsel further submitted that the plaintiff had no locus to institute the suit, and thus, the present appeal must fail, as the father of the plaintiff (appellant No. 1) and the grandfather of the defendant Nos. 4 and 5 (appellant Nos. 2 and 3 respectively) failed to challenge the order dated 08.03.1999 within the prescribed period and the same had attained finality.

22. Ld. counsel for the respondents further submitted that there has been no averment in the plaint by the plaintiff (appellant No. 1 herein) with regard to the applicability of Rule 170(6), thus such practice at bar to advance arguments beyond pleadings is against the well established principle that not only evidence but also submissions/arguments cannot be beyond the pleadings.

23. Sh. Girsa, Ld. counsel for the respondents concluded his arguments by placing reliance upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in the case of Ram Narain Gupta & Ors. v. Gaon Sabha, Siraspur W.P.(C) No. 2983/2011 decided on 05.05.2011 on the legal proposition that it is settled position in law where an alternate remedy of revenue court is available under the scheme of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954, the jurisdiction of civil courts is clearly barred and ousted under the scheme of the Act.

24. Sh. N.K. Tyagi, Ld. counsel for the appellants rejoined his arguments and submitted that the impugned judgment and decree are liable to be set aside as the same is contrary to law and facts.

25. I have carefully, examined and perused the impugned judgment, trial court record, all relevant evidence, oral as well as documentary, the memorandum of appeal, and also considered the submissions advanced by the Ld. counsel for the parties. The trial court has decided all the issues against the plaintiff and dismissed the suit. With regard to the issue No. 1, the onus to prove was on the defendant and whereas with regard to the issue No. 2, the onus to prove the same was on the plaintiff.

26. The main challenge by the plaintiff is that the trial court erred by holding that the jurisdiction of the civil court is barred by Section 185 of the Act, and accordingly, decided the issue Nos. 1 and 2 against the plaintiff.

27. On completion of pleadings, admission/denial of documents by the parties, trial court on 01.11.2001 framed the following issues:

1. Whether the civil court has jurisdiction to try the present suit? ... OPD

2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for declaration and permanent injunction, as prayed for? ... OPP

3. Relief.

28. The trial court vide order dated 01.11.2001 observed that the issue No. 1 be treated as a preliminary issue. The trial court vide order dated 23.05.2009 observed that that evidence must be lead for adjudication of the issues and accordingly, proceeded the case for plaintiff's evidence. The findings of the trial court with regard to issue No. 1 are enshrined in paragraph Nos. 11.1 to 11.10 of the impugned judgment.

29. In order to appreciate the contention of the counsels appearing for the parties, I deem appropriate to reproduce Section 86A and Section 185 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954. Section 86A of the Act, reads as under:

"Section 86A. Ejectment by Revenue Assistant of persons occupying land without title. - Notwithstanding anything contained in sections 84, 85 and 86, the Revenue Assistant also may, on receiving information or on his own motion, eject any person who is liable to be eject from any land on a suit of the Gaon Sabha under any of those sections, after following such procedure as may be prescribed."

30. Section 185 of the Act, reads as under:

"Section 185.Cognizance of suits, etc., under this Act. - (1) Except as provided by or under this Act no court other than a court mentioned in column 7 of the Schedule I shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), take cognizance of any suit, application, or proceedings mentioned in column 3 thereof.

(2) Except as hereinafter provided no appeal shall lie from an order passed under any of the proceedings mentioned in column 3 of the Schedule aforesaid.

(3) An appeal shall lie from the final order passed by a court mentioned in column 3 to the court or authority mentioned in column 8 thereof.

(4) A second appeal shall lie from the final order passed in an appeal under sub-section (3) to the authority, if any, mentioned against it in column 9 of the Schedule aforesaid."

31. The question, whether a Civil Court has jurisdiction to grant declaration with respect to the orders of the Revenue Court, can declare an order at the instance of the appellants/plaintiffs to be null and void has been answered by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in the judgment Ashok Kumar Tyagi v. Sanjay Tyagi 2018 SCC OnLine Del 11699. His Lordship, Rajiv Sahai Endlaw, J., held as under:-

"21. Even otherwise, it has been held in Union of India v. A.V.Narasimhalu (1969) 2 SCC 658, Additional Director General, Directorate General of Central Excise v. Kiran Machines, (2016), 16 SCC 580, Commissioner, Bangalore Development Authority v. Brijesh Reddy, (2013) 3 SCC66, Church of North India v. Lavajibhai Ratanjibhai, (2005) 10 SCC 760, State of Punjab v. Amarjit Singh, (2011) 14 SCC 713 and Girnar Traders (3) v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 3 SCC 1 that once a statute provides a complete code for adjudication of issues arising thereunder, the jurisdiction of the civil court to sit over orders of the authorities constituted under the statue in appeal or to set aside the same on whatsoever ground is impliedly barred. It has been held that, (i) it is clear from a reading of Section 9 of the CPC that Courts have complete jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred; (ii) the jurisdiction of the Civil Court with respect to a particular matter can be said to be excluded, if there is an express provision or by implication it can be inferred that the jurisdiction is taken away; (iii) if the procedure contemplated by a statue is a special procedure, envisaged to effectuate public purpose and the statute confers finality to the decision taken by following the said procedure and the scheme of the Act is complete in itself, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to take cognizance of cases arising under the statute, by necessary implication stands barred; (iv) the Civil Court thereby is devoid of jurisdiction to give declaration on the invalidity of the procedure contemplated under that statute; (v) the only right an aggrieved person has is to approach the Constitution Courts under their plenary power under Articles 226 and 136 respectively of the Constitution of India with self-imposed restriction on their exercise of extraordinary power. It was yet further held that even where there is no express exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, if the examination of the remedies and the scheme of a particular statue contains an intendment that the result of enquiry provided thereunder is decisive and if the statute creates a special right and provides for determination of the right and liability and further lays down that all questions about the said rights and liberties shall be determined by the Tribunals constituted under the said statute, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court would be impliedly barred. I may in this regard state that Supreme Court in Hatti v. Sunder Singh, (1970) 2 SCC 841 held that the Reforms Act is a complete code under which it is clear that anyone wanting a declaration of his right as Bhumidhar, or approach the Revenue Assistant and this he is allowed to do without any period of limitation, because he may not be aware of the fact that a declaration has been issued in respect of his holding in favour of another.

22. Though Section 185(1) of the Reforms Act expressly bars the jurisdiction of the courts other than the courts mentioned in the Schedule to the Reforms Act, to take cognizance of any proceedings mentioned in the Schedule and does not otherwise generally bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Court as some other statutes like Income Tax Act, 1961, Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2015, Competition Act, 2001, The Secularization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 and National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 do, but is is still felt that once the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to declare a person as Bhumidhar under Section 185 of the Reforms Act is barred, the jurisdiction of the Civil court to set aside the said declaration granted by the Revenue Courts would also be barred. Else, it will lead to chaos, with the disputes first festering in the Revenue courts and thereafter having a second round in the Civil Court and would set at naught the purpose for constituting the Revenue Courts which can more conveniently adjudicate the dispute as arising with respect to agricultural land matters." [Emphasis added by underlining and highlighting of text]

32. In this connection, I place reliance on the judgment, passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Hatti v. Sunder Singh (1970) 2 SCC 841, wherein the Apex Court interpreted Section 185 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954. The Apex Court authoritatively laid down that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is clearly barred by Section 185 of the Act read with various items of the Schedule I. The Apex Court in its decision further laid down that the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954, is a complete Code under which it is clear that anyone wanting a declaration of his rights as a bhumidhar, or aggrieved by a declaration issued without notice to him in favour of another, can approach the Revenue Assistant under Item 4 of Schedule I. In the facts of the said case, it was found that all the reliefs combined by the respondent in the suit were within the competent jurisdiction of the Revenue Assistant and the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. It was also held that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is limited to deciding the issue of title referred to it by the Revenue Court which clearly implies that if a question of title is raised in an application for declaration of bhumidhari rights under Item 4 of Schedule I of the Act, that question will then be referred by the Revenue Assistant to the Civil Court. But a party wanting to raise such a question of title in order to claim bhumidhari right cannot directly approach the Civil Court.

33. During the cross examination of PW-1 on 18.04.2013, PW1 admitted that the ownership of the suit property rest in Gram Sabha and the suit property has neither been leased nor allotted by Gram Sabha to plaintiff. It is observed that it is an undisputed fact that the land in suit stand recorded in the khata of the Gaon Sabha and also Bhondu Ram (father of the plaintiff) had been in unauthorized occupation. Thus, the Revenue Assistant was well within his rights to initiate proceedings under Section 86A of the Act on the basis of report of Halka Patwari conferred upon him under the Act. It is further observed that if at all Bhondu Ram or his successor-in-interest was aggrieved by the order dated 08.03.1999 passed by the Revenue Assistant under Section 86A of the Act, the recourse is adequately provided under Entry No. 20A, Column No. 8 of Schedule I of the Act. In view of the said recourse unequivocally provided in Schedule I of the Act, the jurisdiction of civil courts is clearly barred by Section 185 of the Act.

34. With regard to the arguments advanced by the Ld. counsel for the appellant that the trial court failed to even consider the issue of limitation, as the order dated 08.03.1999 was a nullity in the eyes of law, as the proceedings under Section 86A of the Act were initiated beyond the prescribed period. I must say that I am not impressed by the submissions advanced by the Ld. counsel for the appellant. Firstly, no plausible explanation has been tendered by the appellants that what stopped Bhondu Ram or them from challenging the order dated 08.03.1999 passed by the Revenue Assistant in accordance with law. Secondly, on being aggrieved by the order dated 08.03.1999 passed by the Revenue Assistant under the proceedings under Section 86A of the Act, an order which was passed by the Revenue Assistant in exercise of power under the Entry 20A, Column 7 of the Schedule I of the Act, very well in Column 8 and 9, respectively, of Entry 20A, Schedule I, does provide the court of first appeal and the court of second appeal. It is not out of place to observe herein that Bhondu Ram was very much alive when the order dated 08.03.1999 was passed by the Revenue Assistant. Bhondu Ram died on 20.04.2000 and the plaintiff (appellant No. 1 herein), instituted the suit before the trial court only on 20.07.2001 i.e. challenging the order dated 08.03.1999 by seeking declaratory decree and permanent injunction against the defendants (respondents herein). Bhondu Ram never challenged the order dated 08.03.1999 during his lifetime and the same has attained finality. It is apparent nay evident that the challenge to the order dated 08.03.1999 by way of suit for a declaratory decree and permanent injunction by one of the sons of Bhondu Ram and that too after his demise, is nothing but a clever machination to circumvent the limitation period provided under the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954. The position in law is well settled that what cannot be done directly, cannot be done indirectly.

35. The submissions advanced by the Ld. counsel for the appellant that the trial court failed to even consider that the order dated 08.03.1999 was passed by the Revenue Assistant without following the due process procedure enshrined in Rule 170 of the Delhi Land Reforms Rules, 1954. Sh. Tyagi, Ld. counsel for the appellant submitted that the suit before the trial court i.e. civil court, was very well maintainable, as the plaintiff (appellant No. 1 herein) had instituted the suit assailing the order dated 08.03.1999 under Rule 170(6) of the Delhi Land Reform Rules, 1954 framed under the Act, as the word 'suit' has not been defined under the Act and the Rules framed thereunder.

36. Rule 170(6) of the Delhi Land Reforms Rules, 1954, reads as under:

"170. Summary proceedings for ejectment of persons occupying land without title [Section86(A)] - Where on an application from the Pradhan or any member of the Gaon Panchayat or the facts coming to his knowledge otherwise, the Revenue Assistant's satisfied that any person who is liable to ejectment on suit of the Gaon Sabha otherwise than under Section 87 continues to be in possession of the land, otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of this Act or has transferred possession of the land to any other person, the Revenue Assistant may if he thinks that it is necessary so to do, issue notice to such persons and to every other person in possession through him to appear within a fixed time and to show cause why an order to ejectment be not made against them.

(2) The Gaon Sabha and all other persons interested in the land shall be made parties to all such proceedings.

(3) Where any person does not appear in pursuance of the notice under sub-rule (1) or if he appears but does not contest the notice, the Revenue Assistant may make an order for the ejectment of all such persons and every other person claiming possession through him.

(4) If the persons appear in pursuance of the notices under Rule 1 and file objections, the Revenue Assistant shall proceed to hear the Gaon Sabha and the objectors and to record any evidence which they may adduce.

(5) Where, upon the said hearing, the Revenue Assistant is satisfied that such person is liable to ejectment as aforesaid, he shall pass an order for ejectment of such person and every other person in possession through him.

(6) Where an order of ejectment has been passed, the aggrieved person may institute a suit to establish the right claimed by him but subject to the result of such suit if any, the order passed shall be conclusive."

37. With regard to the contention of the Ld. counsel for the respondents that the plaintiff in his plaint did not aver a single word about the applicability of Rule 170(6) of the Delhi Land Reform Rules, 1954, I must state the Rules under the Act have been framed by the Parliament as a delegated legislation and thus this court being the court of first appeal may permit the plaintiff and/or appellants to advance an argument on a law point i.e. applicability of Rule 170(6).

38. The Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954, came into force on 20.07.1954. Its preamble states that it is "an Act to provide for modification of zamindari system so as to create an uniform body of peasant proprietors without intermediaries, for the unification of the Punjab and Agra systems of tenancy laws in force in the State of Delhi and to make provision for other matters connected therewith." The Act is a complete code and provides for the prevention of the fragmentation of agricultural holdings and also, at the material time fixed ceilings on agricultural holdings and dealt with the devolution of tenancy rights on such holdings. The Act lays down the rights that any person can possess in agricultural land in the area to which the Act applies, and the remedies that can be sought in respect of such land for obtaining declaration of their rights or any other declaration for possession. The Act abolished the ownership or agricultural land by the previous proprietors. This was affected by first laying down in Sections 11 and 13 that proprietors will become bhumidhars in respect of their lands which were their khudkasht or Sir, while tenants would become bhumidhars in respect of their holdings. Under Section 6 of the Act, persons belonging in several classes, which included non- occupancy tenants of proprietor's grove and sub-tenants of tenant's grove, and non-occupancy tenants of pasture land, or of land covered by water, and some other classes, shall become Asamis.

39. The arguments advanced by the Ld. counsel for the appellants with regard to the institution of 'suit' in Rule 170(6) includes civil court is fallible and not convincing. The interpretation advanced by the appellants is myopic and would be contrary to the canons of interpretation of statutes. Rule 170 is enshrined under Chapter V of the Rules, 1954. The Delhi Land Reforms Rules, 1954 have been framed by the Parliament under Section 191 of the Act and the same have been framed in exercise of power under delegated legislation. It is observed that the interpretation advanced by the Ld. counsel for the appellants of Rule 170 including 'suit' as suit before civil court would run in direct contravention of Section 86A of the Act, as Rule 170 overtly states to be in reference to Section 86A of the Act. Whereas, this court cannot lose sight that Section 86A of the Act is squarely hit by the embargo of Section 185 of the Act when read with Entry 20A of Schedule I of the Act.

40. Thus, the argument advanced by the Ld. counsel for the appellants that the word 'suit' in Rule 170(6) of the Delhi Land Reforms Rules, 1954 refers to a suit before civil court is fallacious and accordingly rejected.

41. That said, on perusal of the Delhi Land Reforms Rules, 1954, I have observed that Rule 172 is also nestled under Chapter V of the Rules. Rule 172 reads, as under:

"172. Action under rules 170 and 171 not to bar regular suits - Nothing in rules 170 and 171 shall debar any person from establishing his right in a court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with the law for the being in force in respect of any matter for which any order has been made by the Deputy Commissioner."

42. On bare reading of Rule 172, a glimmer of hope does arise in favour of the appellants but I must add that the same is short lived. Rule 172 enables any person to establish his right in a court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with law with regard to action under Rules 170 and 171 in respect of any matter for which any order has been made by the Deputy Commissioner. I am of the view that Rule 172 of the Rules may not come, as the much needed succour to the appellants, as Rule 172 comes into action only with regard to an order made by the Deputy Commissioner. In the case at hand, the plaintiff instituted a suit for declaration and permanent injunctions against the respondents herein with regard to an order passed by the Revenue Assistant under Section 86A of the Act.

43. I, place fruitful reliance upon the judgment passed by our Hon'ble High Court in Ashok Kumar & Ors. v. Munni Devi (Smt.) & Ors. 2012 (129) DRJ 476, His Lordship, Valmiki J. Mehta, J. held that unless the suits are in substance, the suits which fall within the Sections as stated in Column 2, the jurisdiction of the civil courts is not barred by virtue of Section 185 of the Act. No doubt Section 186 states that where a question of title is raised in any proceeding falling under column 3 of the Schedule I of the Act then such a proceeding has to be referred by the revenue court to a civil court to determine the question of title, however, it does not mean that suits where title is in question, and which suits are not the subject matter of columns 2 and 3 of the Schedule I, such suits have to be filed in the revenue courts.

44. His Lordship, further observed that in fact, it is other way round that firstly the suits must in substance be the suits essentially covered under columns 2 and 3 of the Schedule I of the Act, and only thereafter if title of the land is in question then the revenue court will refer the issue of title to civil court, however, if the suits itself are not falling under columns 2 and 3 of Schedule I, for such suits jurisdiction of the civil courts is not barred.

45. Keeping the above legal principle in mind and the ratio of Hatti v. Sunder (1970) 2 SCC 841 and Ashok Kumar & Ors. v. Munni Devi (Smt.) & Ors. 2012 (129) DRJ 476, the order dated 08.03.1999 challenged by the plaintiff was passed by the Revenue Assistant in exercise of power under Section 86A and the same is squarely covered under Columns 2 and 3 of Entry No. 20A of the Schedule I, and thus, the jurisdiction of the civil court is barred.

46. I, may also notice that the plaintiff claims to have acquired bhumidhari rights by operation of law, and thus the declaration seeking that order dated 08.03.1999 be declared null and void by way of the suit instituted before the trial court is also barred, inasmuch, as the exclusive jurisdiction, to grant declaration of the bhumidhari rights vests with the revenue courts. Once it is found that the suit for the reliefs claimed was not maintainable before the civil court, the need to adjudicate whether the plaintiff is entitled for permanent injunction therein is not felt was rightly observed and held by the trial court.

47. I, am of the considered opinion that the suit preferred by the plaintiff (appellant No.1 herein) is barred under the provision of Section 185 of the Act, as the issues raised in the suit could be effectively decided by the revenue court, as the jurisdiction of civil court is barred under the provisions of Section 185 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954.

48. On a parting note, I would like to add that the Apex Court in Jagpal Singh and Others v. State of Punjab (2011) 11 SCC 396 has correctly observed the prevalent position in the country with regard to the land vested in Gram Panchayats. The relevant paragraph No. 13 is reproduced, as under:

"13. We find no merit in this appeal. The appellants herein were trespassers who illegally encroached on to the Gram Panchayat land by using muscle power/money power and in collusion with the officials and even with the Gram Panchayat. We are of the opinion that such kind of blatant illegalities must not be condoner. Even if the appellants have built houses on the land in question they must be ordered to remove their constructions, and possession of the land in question must be handed back to the Gram Panchayat. Regularising such illegalities must not be permitted because it is Gram Sabha land which must be kept for the common use of the villagers of the village."

49. That said, in view of the above discussions and observations, I do not find any illegality, or perversity in the reasoning and conclusions arrived at by the trial court, and therefore it is held that the trial court has rightly, dismissed the suit of the plaint.

50. In view of the above observations and discussions, there is no merit in this appeal and the same is dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents. The judgment and decree dated 09.12.2015 passed by the Ld. Senior Civil Judge (Central), Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi in a civil suit titled as Rameshwar v. Gaon Sabha of Village Jhatikra & Ors. - C.S. No. 790/2016 is confirmed. All interim application(s), moved by the appellants are dismissed, accordingly.

51. Let the decree sheet be drawn up accordingly. Trial court record (TCR) be returned to the trial court along with the certified copy of the judgment and decree as per Order XLI, Rule 37, CPC and applicable Rules.

52. File be consigned to record room.